“The Social Value of Information with an Endogenous Public Signal”, Economic Theory (2018), 66(4), 1059-1087. DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1081-9.
The paper analyses the equilibrium and welfare properties of an economy characterised by uncertainty and payoff externalities in a general model which nests several applications. In relation to when public information is exogenous, the paper finds that the sign of the social value of private information may be overturned with endogenous public information.
“Silent Financial Interests and Product Innovation” (with Ángel L. López), Economics Letters (2018), 170, 109-112. DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.007. Online Appendix.
We study R&D investments, competition, and welfare in markets where investors have asymmetric passive partial ownership holdings in rival firms.
“Information Frictions and Market Power: A Laboratory Study” (with Jordi Brandts and Xavier Vives), CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11378, July 2018. R&R at The Economic Journal. Online Appendix.
We design an experiment to understand whether informational frictions can lead to market power in a context of supply function competition with private information.
“Information and Trading Strategies with Dark Pools” (with Ariadna Dumitrescu and Carolina Manzano), January 2018.
We study the market performance and welfare implications of adding a dark pool (opaque trading venue) alongside an exchange (fully transparent trading venue organised as a limit order book) in a sequential trading game.
Work in progress
“Naive and Sophisticated Traders Competing in Supply Functions”
“An experimental study of banks runs under opacity and transparency”
“Reinhard Selten, the dualist,” (with Rosemarie Nagel, Reza Kheirandish and Shabnam Mousavi), in Routledge Handbook of Behavioral Economics (Roger Frantz, Shu-Heng Chen, Kurt Dopfer, Floris Heukelom, Shabnam Mousavi, eds.), pp. 66-87, July 2016.
Book chapter which reviews Reinhard Selten’s School of Thought on economic behaviour from the perspectives of economic theory and experimentation. We highlight the contrast between these two perspective and how bounded rationality serves the bridge between the two. We make special emphasis on his work related to strategic economic behaviour.
Book reviews & popular press
[Review of the book Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception, by George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller], Observatorio de las Ideas, 34: 17-22, January 2016.