“The Social Value of Information with an Endogenous Public Signal”
Economic Theory, doi: 10.1007/s00199-017-1081-9.
The paper analyses the equilibrium and welfare properties of an economy characterised by uncertainty and payoff externalities in a general model which nests several applications. In relation to when public information is exogenous, the paper finds that the sign of the social value of private information may be overturned with endogenous public information.
“Supply Function Competition, Private Information, and Market Power: A Laboratory Study” (with Jordi Brandts and Xavier Vives), CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11378, March 2017. R&R at The Economic Journal.
We design an experiment to understand whether informational frictions can lead to market power in a context of supply function competition with private information.
“Information and Trading Strategies with Dark Pools” (with Ariadna Dumitrescu and Carolina Manzano), January 2018.
We study the market performance and welfare implications of adding a dark pool (opaque trading venue) alongside an exchange (fully transparent trading venue organised as a limit order book) in a sequential trading game.
“Asymmetries and Innovation” (with Ángel L. López), January 2018.
Work in progress
“Naive and Sophisticated competing in Supply Functions,” December 2016.
The paper addresses how strategically sophisticated subjects compete with boundedly rational subjects in a context of supply function competition with private information. Boundedly rational subjects fall prey of the generalised winner’s curse. The paper analyses the competitiveness and the efficiency of a market that is composed of both sophisticated and boundedly rational subjects.
“Reinhard Selten, the dualist,” (with Rosemarie Nagel, Reza Kheirandish and Shabnam Mousavi), in Routledge Handbook of Behavioral Economics (Roger Frantz, Shu-Heng Chen, Kurt Dopfer, Floris Heukelom, Shabnam Mousavi, eds.), pp. 66-87, July 2016.
Book chapter which reviews Reinhard Selten’s School of Thought on economic behaviour from the perspectives of economic theory and experimentation. We highlight the contrast between these two perspective and how bounded rationality serves the bridge between the two. We make special emphasis on his work related to strategic economic behaviour.
Book reviews & popular press
[Review of the book Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception, by George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller], Observatorio de las Ideas, 34: 17-22, January 2016.